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NOTES
Removal—State Declaratory Actions Based on Federal Question
Jurisdiction—La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co. 1 —PlaintifT, La
Chemise Lacoste, Inc. (Lacoste) is a French corporation which man-
ufactures clothing bearing the emblem of a crocodile. Defendant, Al-
ligator Co. (Alligator), a Delaware corporation, has Federally regis-
tered trademarks for the word "Alligator" and For the design of a
"lizard-like reptile."' Alligator had previously challenged Lacoste's un-
authorized use of the crocodile emblem in the United States in a suit
against Crystal, inc., a licensee of Lacoste. 3 That suit resulted in a
consent decree, reached with Lacoste's approval, acknowledging
Alligator's control of and right to the use of the crocodile emblem in
the apparel context.''
The present action arose out of Lacoste's licensing of the Jean
Paton Corporation to use Lacoste's emblem and name on toiletry
products sold in the United States. After encountering opposition by
Alligator to its patent. application For a toiletries trademark on the
crocodile emblem,' Lacoste filed suit in the Court of Chancery in
Delaware.' The relief sought by Lacoste was a declaratory judgment
that it owned the common law rights to the crocodile emblem placed
on the bottles of toiletries, and an injunction against Alligator, order-
ing Alligator to refrain from interfering with Lacoste's use of the
emblem anywhere in the United States.' Alligator responded, in a
counterclaim For injunctive relief, that Lacoste's use of the emblem
was an infringement of Alligator's trademark rights and constituted
unfair competition . 8
Alligator, contending that Lacoste's claim was one arising under
the laws of the United States," petitioned to remove the action to the
' 506 F.2d. 339 (3d Cir. 1974).
2
 Alligator has four registered trademarks: Reg. No. 75,365 (on the name "Al-
ligator" accompanied by a picture of a four legged alligator); Reg. No, 251,201 (on Ihe
word "Alligator" in script); Reg. No. 706,041 (on the word "Alligator"); Reg. No.
867,953 (on the design of a half alligator). See La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 374
F. Supp. 52, 69 n.75 (0. Del. 1974).
Alligator Cu. v. Crystal, Inc., Civil No. 115-272 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 10, 1956),
'See 374 F. Supp, at 59,
• 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970) permits an owner of a trademark to register his
trademark by filing a written application with the Patent Office,
• La Chemise Lacoste v. Genera] Mills, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 590, 599 (a Del. 1971).
Lacoste successfully moved to suspend the trademark application hearings pending out-
come of the litigation, id. n.4.
7 See La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 313 F. Supp. 915, 916 (I). Del, 1970).
" See 374 F. Supp. at 50.
506 F. 2d at 342; 313 F. Stipp. at 917. Alligator alleged that Lacoste, in seeking
to avoid a threatened federal trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970), necessarily raised a federal trademark question when it
filed the state declaratory action. 313 F. Supp. at 917. This would give the federal
courts original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970), and, thereby, removal juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
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Federal District Court for the District of Delaware." The district
court held that removal was proper and denied Lacoste's motion to
have the removal question certified."
In so holding, the court framed the critical issue as whether the
claim for declaratory relief was one which "arose under" federal law."
The district court followed the approach taken by the Supreme Court
in Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Ca., la to resolve a similar issue in
a different procedural context.'" In , Wycoff; the Court stated that to
determine whether a claim for federal declaratory relief arises under
federal law, the trial court must look to the nature of the underlying
coercive action." Accordingly, the district court held that since
Lacoste sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a defendant
who had threatened suit under the federal trademark statute," the
underlying coercive action was one founded upon a claim arising
under the laws of the United States." The court rejected Lacoste's ar-
gument that its complaint raised no federal claims since it simply
sought a determination of its common law rights."
The district court also decided that it had jurisdiction under a
different theory." Although federal question jurisdiction is normally
established solely on the basis of the complaint,'" the court stated that
where a question of federal status is involved the court may look
beyond the complaint. 21 Therefore, on the basis of the defendant's as-
sertion of its status as a federal trademark owner and the court's as-
1 " 28 U.S.C. § 144 I (b) (1970) allows for removal or a claim based on a federal
question. Although Alligator and Lacoste are parties of diverse citizenship. Alligator
could not have removed on that basis since it is a Delaware corporation and 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b) forbids removal by residents where the sole basis for federal jurisdiction is di-
versity.
" 313 F. Supp. at 916. 918. Interlocutory appeals pursuant to 28 	 §
1292(b) (1970) are largely discretionary. Certification under § 1292(b) by the district
court depends on the trial judge's assessment of the importance of the issue to the case;
even if an issue is certified, the court of appeals may decline to review it until there is a
final judgment. Id.
"313 F. Supp. at 917.
" 344 U.S. 237 (1952),
" See 313 F. Supp. at 917.
15 344 U.S. at 248, The underlying coercive action is the potential suit which the
declaratory defendant had threatened to bring against the declaratory plaintiff, thereby
causing the declaratory plaintiff to seek declaratory relief. By looking to the nature.uf
the underlying coercive action, a court is actually examining a declaratory action as if it
had been brought in its conventional posture; that is, with the party having the coercive
cause of action in the position of plaintiff. Id.
" The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970). 28 U.S.C. § 1338(13) (1970)
grants the federal courts jurisdiction over trademark claims.
" 313 F. Supp. at 917-18.
" Id. at 918. It should be noted that the Lanham Act only extends to federally
registered trademarks, leaving to state law the protection of common law trademarks.
See note 101 infra.
"Id. at 917-18.
" See text at notes 32-36 infra.
313 F. Supp. at 917-18. See Ulichny v. General Elec. Co., 309 F. Supp, 437,
440 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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sessment that the outcome of the case depended upon the determina-
tion of that status, the court held that the real nature of the plaintiff's
claim was federal." On the merits of Lacoste's claim, the district court
determined that Alligator had the rights to the alligator trademark,"
and that Lacoste's use of the mark on toiletries was an
infringement." The court granted the injunctive relief requested by
Alligator in its counterclaim."
The Court of' Appeals for the Third Circuit, finding that re-
moval had been inappropriate, vacated the judgment of the district
court and remanded the case with a direction that the district court
remand it in turn to the state court." First, the court rejected the sec-
ond holding of the district court which was predicated on Alligator's
status as a holder of a federal trademark." Then the court HELD: 1)
the test for determining federal question original jurisdiction in fed-
eral declaratory judgment actions, as expressed in Wycoff, does not
apply in determining federal question jurisdiction in the removal of a
state declaratory judgment proceeding; 28 2) even assuming the ap-
plicability of the Wycoff test, where a federal claim is only one of three
possible theories of trademark litigation available to a party who has
threatened to bring suit against another," an averment of the
threatened federal action will not be read into the declaratory judg-
ment complaint in order to provide removal jurisdiction:" and 3)
since Lacoste's complaint did not contain a federal claim on its face,
removal of the state action was inappropriate. 31
" 313 F. Supp. at 9l8.
" 374 F. Supp. at 7l.
24 Id. at 75.
23 Id. at 76.
26 506 F.2d at 347. The court also dismissed the contention that the appellants
had waived their right to appeal the district court's denial of the motion to remand,
since this was the first opportunity for review in the court of appeals. Id. at '341-42.
2 ' Id. at 345-46. The court rejected at the outset any theory of federal question
jurisdiction based on factors outside the complaint. It reasoned that inferior federal
courts should not create exceptions to a policy (the federal question jurisdiction rules)
so "zealously protected by the Supreme Court." Id. at 345. "The brute fact is that
defendant's status as a federal trademark owner is a matter for defense ... one wholly
inappropriate to the federal question determination." Id. However, in Ulichny v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 309 F. Supp. 437 (N.D,N.Y. 1970), the court held that the status of the
defendant as a federally registered trademark holder is relevant to the issue of whether
federal question jurisdiction exists, in that it exposes the true content of the plaintiffs
claim. Id. at 440. Thus, at least one federal district court has decided that when the
plaintiffs claim necessarily implicates the defendant's status as a federal trademark
holder, a federal question is raised despite the lack of any explicit reference to the fed-
eral claim in the complaint..
" 506 F.2d at 343-45.
as
	text at note 115 infra.
3° Id. at 345-46. The court noted that "Alligator could have brought one or three
types of action against Lacoste: a state common law trademark infringement suit, an
unfair competition suit under state law, or an infringement suit based on its federally
registered trademarks." Id.
31 Id. at 346.
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This note will focus on the holding that the Wycoff approach for
determining original jurisdiction in federal declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings is not applicable to the removal of state declaratory actions.
The rationale of the Wycoff doctrine first will be considered in the
context of Federal declaratory actions. Then, the court's justifications
For not extending the rule to the removal area will be discussed. Fi-
nally, the court's arguendo application of Wycoff to the facts in Lacoste
will be explored for guidance regarding the strength of the Third
Circuit's convictions.
1. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION AND
FEDERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
Section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants the
district courts general federal question jurisdiction over controversies
which "arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."32 Although the "arising under" language of the statute is
nearly identical to the "arising under" provision of Article Ill of the
Constitution," it has long been settled that this statutory grant of
jurisdiction is not coextensive with the constitutional rant. 34 In defin-
ing the outer limits of the constitutional grant, Chief Justice Marshall
stated in Osborn v. Bank of the United States that the federal element
had but to be an original ingredient of the claim in order to confer
jurisdiction." In contrast to the broad sweep of the constitutional
grant are the several judicially-developed rules which limit federal
question jurisdiction under section 1331. justice Cardozo summarized
these rules in Gully v. First National Bank." First, a genuine and pres-
ent controversy must be disclosed on the face of the complaint. 38 Sec-
ond, the federal right or claim must be an essential element of the
plaintiff's cause of action, 3" one that should affect the outcome of the
32
 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
33 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 suites that "[dire judicial power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ...."
" C. W	 m H,vNn nunik or Tit E: LAW Or FEDERAL COURTS. 5 17 at '56 (1970).
33 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
38 Id. at 823.
'" 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
"Id. at 113, citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908); Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
" 299 U.S. at 112. This doctrine was synthesized in justice Holmes' famous
maxim that "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well
Works Co, v, Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
Although the cause of action test is often determinative of federal question juris-
diction, it has not always been followed. The most celebrated deviant is Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co.. 255 U.S. 180 (1921), in which stockholders sued the directors of
a corporation alleging a breach of their fiduciary duty, a state cause of action.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found federal question jurisdiction based on the
plaintiffs contentions that the breach was the acquisition of federal bonds floated pur-
suant to the arguably unconstitutional Federal Farm Loan Act. Id. at 201. Over Holmes'
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case. 4 " Pleadings in the complaint which merely anticipate or reply to
a probable defense will not avail as a basis for jurisdiction. 4 ' This lat-
ter rule is generally referred to as the "well-pleaded complaint" rule,
and it was formulated soon after the congressional grant of general
jurisdiction to the federal district courts in 1875. 42 Its application in-
volves reference to the old common law forms of action to determine
exactly the elements of a well-pleaded complaint." In spite of its
anachronistic mechanics and other drawbacks," the well-pleaded
vigorous dissent, id. at 213, the majority created a test which allowed federal question
jurisdiction where "the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of
the Constitution or laws of the United States ." Id. at 199. On the other hand, other
exceptions to the cause of action test have denied jurisdiction even where there was a
federal cause of action. E.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900). See
also Roecker v. United States, 379 F.2d 400, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1967).
As a general matter, it is questionable whether the cause of action test is very
helpful, where the claim is a mixed one or where a federal statute incorporates state
law or vice versa. Pragmatic considerations, such as the increase in the caseload of the
courts, or the nature of the federal interest, are probably more indicative of where fed-
eral question jurisdiction will lie. Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That A
Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, I 15 U. PA. L. Rev. 890, 905-15 (1967) (hereinaf-
ter cited as Cohen).
4 " 299 U.S. at 112, See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 512
(1920); Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885).
4 ' See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco. Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974),
and cases cited therein.
" Act of March 3, 1875,	 1, 18 Stat. 470. This rule had its genesis in Gold-
Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877). In that case, the defendants
petitioned for removal of a state action involving, as the basis for federal question juris-
diction, federal legislation regulating the water rights of mining companies and their
ownership rights derived under the laws of the United States. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the circuit court's denial of the petition. Id.at 204. It held that before jurisdic-
tion could be retained,
MI must in some form appear upon the record, by
 a statement of facts, "in
legal and logical form," such as is required in good pleading, that the suit
is one which "really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy" as
to a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitu-
tion, or some law (ir treaty of the United States.
Id. at 203-04, quoting I Chit. PI. 213.
The Court held that it was not enough that the construction of federal law may
become necessary. Id. at 203. Thus, since the petitioners failed to aver specific facts im-
plicating a federal claim, the pleadings did not reveal a federal question. Id.
13
 C. WRIGI IT. HANDBOOK of TIIE LAry OF FEDERAL Covers. § 18 at 60-61 (1970).
An example of how the old forms of action may be crucial to the determination of fed-
eral question jurisdiction may be round in a comparison of an action to quiet title with
one to remove a specific cloud on a title. In the former the complaint need only aver
the plaintiff's right to title, while in the latter the plaintiff must plead in the complaint
the cloud which he is seeking to remove, Although a federally based right to the land
might be present in both cases, only in an action to remove a cloud is it proper to in-
clude the right in the pleadings. Therefore, the assertion of a federal right in an action
to remove a cloud on a title might confer jurisdiction, e.g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S.
486, 489.90 (1917), while its assertion in an action to quiet title theoretically will not.
E.g., Marshall v. Desert Properties Co., 103 F.2d 551, 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 563 (1939).
" See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 39, at 915-16. Cohen questions whether federal
jurisdiction should not vest based on a federal defense if the issue is totally federal; he
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complaint rule still serves as the delineation of those actions over
which the federal courts have jurisdiction.'"
Two years prior to the Court's restatement in Gully of the prin-
ciples of original federal question jurisdiction, Congress had passed
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. 46 This Act promised difficul-
ties with the well-pleaded complaint rule.'" By definition, the rule is
predicated on the position of the parties to a controversy as either
plaintiff or defendant, since, under the rule, a federal question which
is properly a matter for defense cannot be a basis for jurisdiction.
However, the most striking feature of the declaratory judgment action
is that either party to a controversy may seek the declaration. Thus,
the positioning of the parties in such a proceeding depends not on to
whom a cause of action has accrued in the conventional sense, but
rather, on who has sought the declaration. For example, a potential
defendant, uncomfortable at the prospect of a possibly increasing lia-
bility to a potential plaintiff may seek a speedy declaration of his
rights by initiating a declaratory action. Therefore, under this proce-
dure it is conceivable that, if the well-pleaded complaint rule were ap-
plied rigidly and a declaratory plaintiff were to seek a declaration with
respect to his federal defense to an anticipated, non-federal claim of
the declaratory defendant, federal question jurisdiction would be
founded on what would ordinarily be a defense. The pleading in the
declaratory complaint of what conventionally would be labeled a fed-
eral defense would be technically proper, since it would be an "essen-
tial element" of the declaratory plaintiff's statutory "cause of action."
Such a complaint would be "well-pleaded" and, therefore, it would
create an appropriate basis for jurisdiction. This result necessarily
would broaden the jurisdiction of the federal courts."
Such a rigid application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in
the declaratory judgment context is not acceptable for two reasons.
also doubts the usefulness of the cause of action test in cases where federal and state
law are intermingled. Id. at 898.
" Set, 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25, p. 124-25
(C. Wright ed. 1960).
16 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
" For a detailed treatment of the difficulties involved in determining federal
question jurisdiction in federal declaratory judgment proceedings, see Mishkin, The Fed-
eral "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Cotum. L. REV. 157, 176-84 (1953) (hereinafter
cited as Makin); Note, Federal. Question Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 55
KY. L. Itt:v. 150 (1966); Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction 4 Federal Courts and the De-
claratory Judgment Act, 4 VAN D. L. REV. 827 (1951). See also Developments in the
Law—Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787, 802-03, 863, 864 (1949).
" Some commentators feel that this eventuality is preferable. The American Law
Institute, in its STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CoukTs TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 6 (1968) (hereinafter cited as ALI &rimy) observes that
there are two ways of handling the declaratory judgment action. The first is historical
and analyzes the action as it if were a coercive suit. Id, at 76. The second is to judge the
declaratory suit on its own merits, thereby allowing jurisdiction based 011 a federal de-
fense. Id. The drafters adopt the second approach in their proposed change, § 1311(a),
to federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 5.
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First, it would undermine the judicial policy, developed pursuant to
the perceived congressional intent to limit the original jurisdiction of
the district courts, that federal defenses should not confer
jurisdiction." it would be ironic if a rule which was created to narrow
federal question jurisdiction in conventional suits could be used to ex-
pand it in the context of declaratory judgments. Secondly, this expan-
sion of the original jurisdiction of the federal courts would be in con-
flict with the express judicial" and statutory' policy that the De-
claratory Judgment Act is to have only procedural effect, and should
not be construed to enlarge subject matter jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has on two occasions addressed these prob-
lems which are created by applying the rules of federal question
jurisdiction, such as the well-pleaded 'complaint rule, to determine
jurisdiction in federal declaratory judgment proceedings. In Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 52 Phillips Petroleum Company brought an
action in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that
contracts for the purchase of natural gas between Phillips and several
defendants were still operative." The contracts contained a condition
subsequent which allowed the defendants to terminate the contracts if
another company, which planned to construct and operate a pipeline
to carry natural gas, failed to secure a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity for the proposed! pipeline from the Federal Power
Commission by a certain date. Although the Commission had issued a
certificate, it was conditioned upon certain terms. The defendants
then gave notice of termination, contending that no certificate in fact
had been issued. Thereupon Phillips brought suit, alleging that the
conditional certificate was a certificate of public convenience and
necessity "within the meaning of said Natural Gas Act and said
contracts."'' The district court agreed with Phillips and the court of
appeals affirmed."
The Supreme Court held that since the controversy upon which
Phillips sought a declaratory judgment was not one which arose under
l" As indicated earlier, judicial construction of the "arising under" language of
the Act of 1875 was narrower than the construction given to the "arising under" lan-
guage of' the Constitution. SO' text at notes 33-45 supra. It is . unclear whether this nar-
row construction was reflective of congressional intent or of judicial wisdom which rec-
ognized the need, under a federal system, for reposing a limited original jurisdiction in
the national courts. Commentators have fOund the legislative history to be inconclusive
and meager despite the importance of the enactment. See generally P. BA- roli„ P.
MISHkiN, ET AL. HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM,
870-73 (2d ed. 1973).
" Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) provides that "Idn a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction ... any court of the United Slates ... may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration ...." (Emphasis added.)
az 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
at 670-71.
"Id. at 670.
174 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1949).
78
NOTES
the laws of the United States, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
render the declaratory judgment between the non-diverse parties. 56
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, pointed out that the De-
claratory Judgment Act did not alter the subject matter jurisdiction of
the inferior federal courts;" it merely enlarged the range of remedies
available to an aggrieved party." Thus, he continued, a plaintiff may
not use the declaratory procedure to gain admission to the federal
courts with a claim or right that otherwise would not confer
ju risdiction.""
Upon examination of Phillips' claim the Court found that, had
Phillips brought a conventional suit for damages or specific perfor-
mance under the contracts, the suit would not have presented a fed-
eral question "for the simple reason that such a suit would 'arise"
under the State law governing the contracts." 89 The federal issue —
whether there had been granted a certificate of public convenience
and necessity within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act — would
have been injected into a complaint alleging breach of contract only in
anticipation of a defense that the condition subsequent of the contract
had in fact occurred." Such a claim by the plaintiff would not have
been sufficient to create jurisidiction, since it was not an "essential
element" of his cause of action which would affect the outcome of the
case. To hold otherwise would be to allow the plaintiff's artful plead-
ing of an anticipated defense to be the basis for jurisdiction, in clear
contradiction to established rules of federal question jurisdiction."
In more general terms, the principle set forth in Skelly is that de-
claratory judgment proceedings can at times place a controversy in a
deceptive procedural posture, so that federal question jurisdiction ap-
pears to exist where it clearly would not exist if the proceeding were a
conventional one. Lest the federal courts hear and decide cases that
should he heard and decided in state court, the federal judiciary must
examine such proceedings and rearrange the parties as though they
were in the context of a conventional suit. This principle is but a vari-
ation of the one which underlies the "well-pleaded" complaint rule,
"" 339 U.S. at 674.
57 Id. at 671.
se Id
55 Id. at 673-74.
" Id. at 672.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970).
ex 339 U.S. at 672. Despite all the language in Skelly about the artful pleading of
the federal controversy, it has been suggested that no federal question even existed.
Within, supra note 47, at 183-84. It is questionable whether the incorporation in a pri-
vate contract of the happening of a federal event creates a federal issue. Even the in-
corporation of federal law by state law has nut always been sufficient for original fed-
eral question jurisdiction. Sr!' Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1994), in
which the Court denied original federal jurisdiction over a claim made under
Kentucky's Employers' Liability Act, which incorporated ihe Federal Safety Appliance
Act Standards.
as
	
339 U.S. at 673-74.
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which warns prospective plaintiffs that they cannot create federal
question jurisdiction over what is a state cause of action by incorporat-
ing into their complaint an anticipated federal defense.
This policy of not enlarging the federal question jurisdiction of
the federal courts on the basis of declaratory pleadings was reiterated,
albeit in dictum, in Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co." Wycoff,
whose business involved the transportation of motion picture films
and newsreels in interstate commerce, was also a carrier of such items
between points within Utah. Fearing interference from the Public
Service Commission of Utah, Wycoff brought suit in federal court to
establish its immunity from the Commission's rulings. Specifically,
Wycoff sought a declaration that its routes in Utah constituted inter-
state corn merce. 65 The district court dismissed the complaint, but the
court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the intrastate
transportation in question was an integral part of interstate commerce
and thus immune from state regulation." The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and dismissed the suit For lack of justicia-
bility, holding that there was no showing of any actual controversy be-
tween the parties.'''
Nevertheless, the Court went on to discuss whether there would
have been a federal question had the controversy been a justiciable
one." The declaratory complaint raised the federal issue of whether
Wycoff's routes constituted interstate commerce immune from state
regulation. The Court found that, under the traditional rules for de-
termining federal question jurisdiction, this federal issue would have
been a federal defense to what would have been an action by the state
commission and, therefore, could not confer federal question
jurisdiction." This became clear, the Court pointed out, if one recog-
64 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
65 Id. at 239. Initially Wycoff also sought an injunction preventing the Utah Pub-
lic Service Commission from interfering with its transportation of films over routes au-
thorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Supreme Court had granted
certiorari on the issue of whether a three judge district court convened pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2281 should have heard the case. Id. at 240. Wycoff, however, abandoned its
prayer for injunctive relief. Nevertheless, the Court held that such relief would have
been inappropriate in any case since the plaintiff had not met its burden of showing
probable or threatened irreparable injury. Id. at 240-41.
68
 Wycoff Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 195 F.2d 252, 255 (10th Cir. 1951).
67 344 U.S. at 240-41. The Court pointed out that Wycoff had not shown any
risk of penalty, liability, or prosecution which declaratory relief' would have avoided. Id.
at 245.
The Court also noted that were the declaratory action justiciable, it would
nevertheless have to exercise its discretion and refuse jurisdiction for two reasons. First;
the state action had not properly ripened. It is the policy of the federal courts to wait
until the controversy has become concrete, especially where there is the possibility or a
Federal-state conflict. Id. at 245-46. Second, federal courts have traditionally been reluc-
tant to preempt the workings of administrative bodies. The Court here emphasized the
need for the administrative bodies to have "the initial right to reduce the general
policies of state regulatory statutes into concrete orders and the primary right to take
evidence and make findings of fact." Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
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nized that "in many actions for declaratory judgments, the realistic
position of the parties is reversed."" Thus, where the "functional de-
fendant", i.e., the declaratory plaintiff who would have been the de-
fendant in a conventional proceeding, states as his affirmative cause
of action in the declaratory complaint what would have been a federal
defense to a threatened state cause of action if the suit had arisen in a
conventional procedural posture, federal question jurisdiction will not
lie and the state nature of the threatened action will control." Al-
though this section of the opinion is dictum, it is significant for its
recognition of the principles stated earlier in Skelly."
Application of this approach in Skelly and Wycoff resulted in de-
terminations of no federal question jurisdiction in both cases. There is
nothing in either opinion, however, nor is there anything in the legis-
lative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which indicates that
the Skelly- Wycoff apprOach should be used only to deny federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Indeed, if the Declaratory Judgment Act is to have a
procedural effect. only, it is axiomatic that, just as the Skelly - Wycoff ap-
proach should not expand the jurisdiction of the district courts,
neither should it contract it by ousting the district courts from juris-
diction over controversies which clearly would have been within their
original jurisdiction had they been prosecuted in a conventional fashion.
Such a symmetrical application of the theory underlying the
Skelly- Wycoff approach has generally been followed in the federal
courts." Although the Skelly - Wycoff rule has been utilized to deny
original jurisdiction in those cases where the declaratory complaint
raises what would have been a federal defense to a state claim, 74
jurisdiction has been allowed in declaratory actions based on a defense
to what would have been a federal coercive action in the conventional
procedural posture." Jurisdiction of this kind has been exercised
primarily, 7" though by no means exclusively," in the patent area.
711 hi.
71
n See text at notes 54-58 supra.
73
 See text at notes 74-77 infra.
74
 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2c1 237, '241
(3d Cir, 1972); Chandler v, OBryan, 445 F.2d 1045, 1055 (10th Cir. 1971); Product
Eng'r & Mfg., Inc, v. Barnes, 424 F.2d 42, 44 (10th Cir, 1970); Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co,
v. Pennsylvania, 372 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1974); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Union
Carbide, 319 F. Supp. 307, 312 (S.D,N.Y. 1970).
" In tact, both Skelly and Wycoff cite with approval one commentary which sug-
gests that, where the complaint in the coercive action anticipated by the declaratory ac-
tion would properly raise a federal question, there should be federal question jurisdic-
tion, Developments in the Law — Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARI.% L. REV. 787, 803 (1949),
cited in 344 U.S. at 248 1).6; 339 U.S. at 674.
" See, e.g., Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co„ 329 U.S. 394
(1947); E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2c1 852 (7th Cir. 1937) (pa-
tent issue decided on the merits without any discussion of jurisdiction).
77
 In Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167 UMW, '325 U.S. 161 (1945), the
Supreme Court reached the merits of a declaratory suit, initiated in federal court, in
which the plaintiff-employer sought to determine whether the Fair Labor Standards Act
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In summary, Skelly and Wycoff recognize that the declaratory
judgment procedure can distort the determination of federal question
jurisdiction since the rules of determining such jurisdiction were de-
veloped in reference to conventional suits. Skelly clearly indicates that
a rigid application of the well-pleaded complaint rule would under-
mine the clear congressional intent that the Declaratory Judgment Act
not expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 78
Both cases suggest that one way of insuring adherence to this con-
gressional intent is to determine federal question jurisdiction in de-
claratory judgment proceedings as though the controversy had been
raised in a conventional suit."
II. APPLICATION OF SKELLY-WYCOFF
PRINCIPLES TO REMOVAL OF
STATE DECLARATORY uDGmENT PROCEEDINGS
Federal question removal jurisdiction is generally determined ac-
cording to the same standards as original federal question
jurisdiction." Section 1441(b) of Title 28" allows for removal if the
federal court would have had original jurisdiction; the language defin-
ing "federal question" in the removal statute is identical to that in the
original jurisdiction statute." Since state declaratory judgment pro-
required that time spent by miners in traveling underground between portal and the
working face of the mine had to be included in the work week and compensated ac-
cordingly. Id. at 163. The plaintiffs declaratory complaint stated affirmatively what
would have been its defense to a coercive suit by employees for back wages under the
Act, namely, that the Act did not require compensation for such hours. Id. The Court,
in reaching the merits, did not discuss the issue of federal question jurisdiction.
7" 339 U.S. at 671.
" 344 U.S. at 248; 339 U.S. at 671-74. The ALI concurs in this analysis of the
current posture of the law. Citing Skelly and Wycoff the reporters conclude that there is
strong language from the Supreme Court supporting the historical test for jurisdiction;
that is, "that the declaratory action may be entertained in federal court only if the coer-
cive action which would have been necesary, absent the declaratory judgment proce-
dure, might have been so brought." ALI STunv.supra note 48, at 76.
"See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 38 at
130.31 (2d ed. 1970); 1 BARRON & HOLT/OFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Civil §
102 at 468 (C. Wright ed. 1960).
" 28 U.S.C. 4 1441 (1970) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil ac-
tion brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or de-
fendants to the district court of the United States .. .
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship
or residence of parties....
82 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970), supra note 81, with 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1970), which provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ...
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
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ceedings frequently have the same procedurally distorting effects as
the analogous federal proceedings, 63
 the analytical principles which
determine original jurisdiction in the latter should he used to deter-
mine removal jurisdiction in the former. Since Skelly-Wycoff principles
determine jurisdiction in federal declaratory actions according to the
same original federal question jurisdiction standards, these principles
are therefore relevant to removal of state declaratory proceedings.
There is no reason to assume that rigid application of the well-
pleaded complaint rule to petitions for removal of state declaratory
judgment proceedings would not produce the same anomalies as
would its application to federal declaratory actions. For example, if
the plaintiff in Skelly had sought declaratory relief' in state, rather than
federal, court with a complaint that anticipated the federal question
implicit in the defendant's defense," rigid application of the well-
pleaded complaint rule would have sustained a petition by the defen-
dant to remove to federal district court, just as a rigid application of
the rule in Skelly would have sustained a finding of original federal
question jurisdiction.
In Lacoste, the Third Circuit nevertheless found it significant that
both Skelly and Wycoff involved federal, rather than state, declaratory
proceedings." The court asserted that the constraints of removal pol-
icy, which dictate that the statute granting removal jurisdiction be
strictly construed,"" make the Skelly-Wycoff approach to the determina-
tion of original jurisdiction in declaratory actions inappropriate to the
removal question where, as here, the approach would result in a find-
ing of jurisdiction." The purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule,
the court noted, is to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts."
Since the purview of the removal statute is similarly limited, any ap-
proach to determining federal question jurisdiction which might in-
crease the jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot be followed."
The court expressed additional reservations about the use of the
K  Compare the Federal Declaratory judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), the
text of which is at note 51 supra, with the Delaware Declaratory judgment Act, DEL.
Com.: ANN. tit. 10 § 6501 (1974), which provides that:
In cases of actual controversy, except with respect to divorce or annulment
of marriage, the Supreme Court, the Superior Court and the Court of
Chancery, upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appropriate
pleadings, may declare rights and other legal relations of any interested
party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be prayed, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and be reviewable as such.
"The federal clement of the complaint • in Skelly was whether a certificate of pub-
lic convenience and necessity had been issued within the meaning of the Natural Gas
Act. See text at notes 60-62 supra.
85 506 F.2d at 343.
" See litAkRoN & Hourzortz, FEnExat, PRAcricE AND PROCEDURE, § 101 at 460
n.3.5 and cases cited therein.
" 506 F.2d at 343-45.
" 5 M. at 343 n.3.
" Id. at 344-45.
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Skelly-Wycoff approach. Both Skelly and Wycoff were cases that denied
jurisdiction, thereby keeping out of federal court issues, such as the
continued existence of a contract or the limits of the regulatory power
of a state agency, which were better decided in state forums." While
it acknowledged the necessity of going beyond the complaint to deny
federal jurisdiction,"' the court in Lacoste questioned whether such an
approach is justified where it serves to confer jurisdiction and where
it results in the removal of a case already in the state forum. 92 Implicit
in the court's position is the premise that the sole justification for the
Skelly-Wycoff approach is that the federal judiciary should not decide
cases which, for reasons of federalism, are better decided in state
court. This premise, however, is inconsistent with statements in both
Skelly and Wycoff that the declaratory procedure should have no effect
on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts." Moreover,
the Lacoste court recognized that the "Wycoff principle is merely the
federal question corollary of the axiom that the 'operation of the
[federal] Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.' "94
 This man-
date should work both ways; just as it should not expand the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts, it should also not contract that jurisdiction
by denying removal to those controversies which would clearly he re-
movable in their conventional posture. To hold otherwise is to allow
functional defendants to defeat federal jurisdiction over a controversy
through invocation of a state procedural device — the state declaratory
judgment act — that surely was not intended to have such effect.
The court further noted that the application of Skelly-Wycoff to
removal is incompatible with the axiom that plaintiffs cannot remove
an action to federal court. 95 In Wycoff the Supreme Court suggested
that to determine original federal question jurisdiction in those in-
stances in which the declaratory defendant is the functional plaintiff,
a court should examine the controversy as though it had been
brought in a conventional suit." In such cases, then, jurisdiction will
hinge on whether the functional plaintiffs coercive action would have
p" Id. at 343 n.3. The federal system requires that the federal courts minimize
their intrusion into areas of state law, e.g,, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44
(1971). The Supreme Court's refusal to find appellate jurisdiction over a case which
rests on independent and adequate state grounds, see Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), and the narrow ambit of federal question jurisdiction, see
text at notes 32-40 supra, are examples of the federal judiciary's sensitivity to the need
for an independent state legal system. Such limitations on federal jurisdiction maintain
the interstitial nature of federal law and the supplemental function of the federal
judiciary. See P. BArott, MiSI Ili IN, FE AL, I-I ART 3, VINCI ISLER'S 'Fla: FEDERAL COURTS ANL)
THE FEDERAL SVSTE51, 470.71 (2d ed. 1973).
01 506 F.2d at 343 n.3.
02 Id. at 343.
93 339 U.S. at 671; accord, 344 U.S. at 248.
" 4 506 F.2d at 343 n.3, quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240
(1937),
"s
	 F.2d at 343 n.4.
"" See text at notes 70-74 supra.
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contained a federal question. To apply this rule to the removal con-
text, the Lacoste court claimed, would allow the functional plaintiff to
invoke removal jurisdiction." This conclusion, however, ignores the
premise underlying the axiom, namely, that since a plaintiff who has a
federal claim which may be vindicated in either a state or federal
court has the initial choice of forum, he should not be allowed to
change his mind in midstream and remove his action to the federal
court. 98 The functional plaintiff, however, who is actually the defen-
dant in a state declaratory action, has not had this choice. Therefore,
the axiom should not be applied to him.
The Lacosm court's reasons for distinguishing the federal ques-
tion issue involved in the removal or state declaratory actions from the
Federal question issue involved in federal declaratory actions and, con-
sequently, its reasons for not applying the Skelly-Wycoff approach to
removal proceedings, present several problems. First, the court's insis-
tence on strictly construing removal jurisdiction is misplaced. Strict
construction of the removal statute"9 does not require denial of re-
moval in a case which falls squarely within the confines of the statute.
Since the Wycoff approach is only a means of precisely defining which
cases arise under the federal question jurisdiction statute, it is difficult
to see how the strict construction argument, as a general matter, is
relevant to the determination of whether the Wycoff approach should
he applied to federal question jurisdiction issues in removal proceed-
ings. A case either arises under federal law or it does not, and the
Wycoff doctrine is simply an aid to that determination. Second, the
court's perception that the removal statute and the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule are specific impediments to the application of the
Skelly-Wycoff approach to removal questionsin misconceives the under-
lying thrust of the Skelly-Wycoff rationale. lt is true, as the court points
out, that the issue of whether a state declaratory action should be re-
moved on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction has generally
been resolved solely on the basis of the contents of the complaint,"'
as in determinations of original federal question jurisdiction.'" It
does not follow, however, that adherence to a strict removal policy
and the well-pleaded complaint rule mandates rejection of the Wycoff
approach. If anything, the reverse is' true. Wycoff is a means of distin-
guishing federal question cases litigated in federal courts in a manner
consistent with the demands of our federal system. It serves to main-
tain the procedural integrity of declaratory actions and the substantive
scope of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Rigid application of the
22 506 F.2c1 at 343 11.4.
" Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106 (1941).
I"' 28 U.S.C. § 1441 ( I 970),
t" 506 F.2d at 343-45.
"I ' Id. at 343-44.
"2 'Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894) and Gully v. First
Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936), which were removal cases restricting federal question
jurisdiction, are often cited in original federal question jurisdiction cases,
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well-pleaded complaint rule, on the other hand, would have the oppo
site effect. As discussed earlier, the distorted posture of sonic de-
claratory actions would present federal issues in the declaratory com-
plaint which but for the declaratory procedure could not confer fed-
eral jurisdiction.'" 3 Therefore, if federal question rules are in be
strictly construed, the Wycryf approach must. be employed to reliably
ascertain those cases which truly do "arise under" federal law. To
eliminate Wycoff is perhaps to embrace the liberal view of federal
question jurisdiction that declaratory actions are new fOrms of ac-
tion and should be judged on their own merits rather than analyzed
as to the underlying coercive action.'" Thus, federal defenses well-
pleaded in the'declaratory complaint would confer jurisdiction.
The Lacoste court's rejection of Wycoff is also inequitable to de-
claratory defendants. The declaratory defendant with a federal claim
is thereby trapped in the state court, even though he could have
brought his claim in the federal forum'" 5 if he had been able to beat
the declaratory plaintiff to the courthouse. Then, depending upon the
substantive nature of the claim, the state declaratory judgment could
be res judicata as to the Federal rights.'" Consequently, the defendant
could be deprived of his right to litigate his federal claim in a federal
court. This possibility promotes forum shopping, a practice discour-
aged by the judiciary.'" 7. The comparative scope of discovery rules,
the general feeling that state courts are less protective of Federal
rights, and the advantages of immediate appellate review in the fed-
eral judiciary are examples of possible motivations for the practice. 1 " In
fact, in Lacoste, the removal allowed Alligator to join Jean Patou,
1 °' See text at notes 47-48 supra.
ic" This view has the advantage of simplicity in that the declaratory complaint is
judged in the same manner as other complaints. It also avoids the speculation, required
by Wycoff as to what coercive suit the declaratory action is anticipating. 506 F.2d at
345-46. See note 48 supra.
"" The inequity to the declaratory defendant is minimized where he chooses to
delay his claim, perhaps using it to harass the declaratory plaintiff. In such a case the
only remedy is to seek declaratory relief settling once and for all the rights of the par-
ties.
'"' In the trademark area, "Lai final determination by a state court with respect to
the 14 rights of the parties is, of course, conclusive." 4 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW or UNFAIR
ComPErrrioN, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES. § 90.2(b) at 344 (1970).
017 In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court eliminated
forum shopping in diversity cases with respect to the substantive law to be applied,
when it held that the federal district courts must apply the substantive law of the forum
state. Id. at 78. Although the forum shopping which might he involved in potential de-
claratory judgment situations is distinguishable from Erie situations, and although non-
substantive differences in forums will always exist, the Lacoste court's opinion allows for
increased procedural maneuvering by the declaratory plain tiffOnclional defendant,
without regard to the actual substance of the claim, so as to achieve a more favorable
forum.
"" See generally Note, The Choice Between Slate and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in
Virginia, 51 VA. L. REV. 178 (1965); Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of
Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 lowA L. REV. 933 (1962).
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Lacoste's licensee, as a third party defendant.'"
One thing is certain as a result of the Third Circuit's rejection of
the Skelly - Wycoff approach in favor of a mechanistic application of the
well-pleaded complaint. rule: a functional plaintiff is denied his right
to opt for a federal forum if the functional defendant wins the race to
the courthouse and files a state declaratory complaint which carefully
avoids stating the functional plaintiff's federal claim. It is not as clear,
however, whether the Third Circuit would apply this same mechanis-
tic approach if the declaratory action was based on a federal issue
which would otherwise have been a defense in a coercive suit.. If the
court would be consistent with its rigid application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule, a carefully worded complaint in this case would have
to be removable. Such a result would, of course, offend Skelly, which
specifically disapproved the use of the declaratory procedure to allow
jurisdiction where otherwise there would be none."" It is unlikely
therefore that such removal would be granted.
However, to deny removal would produce an inconsistent ap-
proach to removal based on a federal question in state declaratory ac-
tions. Where the declaratory complaint based on state law is filed in
anticipation of a federal claim which would have been brought by the
declaratory defendant, the court looks solely at the face of the com-
plaint without examining the conventional posture of the underlying
controversy. Where, however, the complaint expressly contains a fed-
eral claim which, but. for the declaratory proceeding, would be a de-
fense, the court will look outside the complaint to the conventional
posture of the underlying controversy in order to infer the defensive
nature of the claim. The only explanation for these two inconsistent
approaches is a policy of restricting removal actions.
Furthermore, it is uncertain how the Third Circuit will analyti-
cally justify its position when faced with the latter instance where the
declaratory plaintiff anticipates a federal -claim and alleges in his com-
plaint a federal defense. Although clearly a federal case, the court
may not look beyond the complaint to determine the nature of the
anticipated suit,'" nor, however, may it confer jurisdiction based
solely on the federal defense in the complaint. In this respect the
Third Circuit's analysis of the general inapplicability of Skelly and
Wycoff is conceptually incomplete. Perhaps the court would embrace
the broad view that declaratory actions should be judged on their own
merits" 2 despite the language in Skelly and Wycoff,'" or the approach
1"9 See 313 F. Stipp. at 916-17. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), additional parties
joined pursuant to FELL R. Civ. P. 19 may he served "not more than 100 miles from the
place in which the action is commenced." Thus, Jean Patou Corp., although it did no
business in the state of Delaware and was not subject to its jurisdictional statute, could
be reached in a federal suit, although perhaps not in a state suit.
2" 339 U.S. at 673-74.
'' See text at note 38 supra.
"2
 See text at notes 104 and 48 .mpra,
"3 339 U.S. at 673-74; accord, 344 U.S. at 248.
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that a court will look at the conventional posture of the declaratory
suit only if the declaratory complaint explicitly raises the federal issue.
Whatever approach the court chooses, its present wholesale rejection
of the applicability of Wycoff to state declaratory action removal has
not been fully justified nor_ haveits implications been properly ex-
plored.
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ARCUENDO APPLICATION OF
WYCOFF TO THE FACTS IN LACOSTE
In Lacoste the court found that even if Wycoff did apply, no
jurisdiction existed." 4 In light of the nature of the coercive suit that
the declaratory action anticipated, the court found that the defendant
had had three options. Alligator could have brought an unfair com-
petition suit under state law, a state common law trademark infringe-
ment suit, or a suit based on Alligator's federally registered
trademark. 15 Since it was not clear "as a matter of practical wisdom
or of the record" 16 that Alligator would have relied on its federal
claim, the court felt it improper to speculate that it would have done
so. Therefore, the court held that it would not find an implied aver-
ment of a threatened federal action.'"
On the surface, this analysis is attractive since the defendant
both conceptually and practically could have brought any one of the
three suits."' This is especially true in the trademark area in which
both jurisdictionalu° and substantive law"° overlap. The federal
trademark statute, the Lanham Act, is said to supplement, not to sup-
plant the common law of trademarks."' Therefore, due to this pecul-
14 506 F.2d at 345.
"' Id. at 345-46.
" 13 Id. at 345.
"" Id. at 346.
"" Unless Alligator had some reason for avoiding the federal court, however, all
three causes of action would probably have been brought in federal court, with the two
state claims joined to the 'lidera' claim, tinder a theory of pendant jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1970). See Hum v. Oursier, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
"9 Congress has provided for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over fed-
erally registered trademarks. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970) provides that:
[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action aris-
ing under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent and copyright cases.
120 Trademark infringement can be an element of an unfair competition cause of
action, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (b) (1970).
121 See 4 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR ComPETiTioN, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES. § 97.3(a) at 582-88 (1970). Federal registration is prima facie evidence of
the trademark's validity, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1970), and the registrant's right to use the
mark; it furthermore creates nationwide constructive notice of these facts. 15 U.S.C. §
1072 (1970). Registration also makes available to the holder certain fedentl remedies for
any infringement of his rights. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-21 (1970). Even though there are dis-
tinct advantages to federal registration, the right to use trademarks and the validity of
common law marks are not dependent upon federal registration. Callman notes that
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iar duality in the trademark area, it is certainly conceivable that
Lacoste's claim could have arisen in defense to a coercive action by Al-
ligator that did not present a federal question for jurisdictional pur-
poses. Since there is authority which holds that the mere possibility of
a federal question is insufficient to ground jurisdiction, 122 , it would be
inappropriate fbr the court here to speculate or rely on the probabil-
ity that the threatened coercive action would be federal, as a basis for
removal. In general, tinder the doctrine of federalism, the federal
judiciary is reluctant to reach federal questions in cases which might
be brought or decided on state grounds. 123 Therefore, the Lacoste
court arguably was justified in refusing to imply a federal question.
This concurrent and overlapping nature of state and federal
trademark law probably facilitated rejection of the Wycoff doctrine al-
together. The ambiguous boundaries of the law of trademarks 124
made Lacoste a difficult case in which to analyze the applicability of
Wycoff but an easy one to decide to leave in the state courts. This type
of suit is often litigated in the state courtsm and therefore the court
of appeals may have felt little or no compulsion to grant removal in
order to protect the federal nature of the right. Together with the
court's obvious concern for limiting its exercise of removal jurisdic-
tion, this factor — inertia — may have been the underlying rationale
of' this decision.
The critical factor in the Lacoste court's determination that, as-
suming the Wycoff approach was applicable, this suit could still not be
removed, was the speculation required to infer the federal claim. Also
important, however, is the implication that were it a matter of corn-
trademark rights arise out of common law use and appropriation, and not by virtue of
statutory registration. 4 R. CALLMAN, supra at 585. In the Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879), the Supreme Court held that the Copyright Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, does
nut confer on Congress the power to regulate trademarks, and therefore the federal
government can regulate trademarks only in conjunction with the Commerce Clause,
Id. at 93-96. At present the jurisdictional statute clearly omits trademark cases from the
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts over patent and copyright actions.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970). Accordingly, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over federal trademark actions, and final determinations by the state courts with respect.
to the rights of the parties are conclusive. 4 R. CALLNIAN. supra § 90.2(b) at 341. There
also exists an independent. stale common law of trademarks. An element or the state
com1114m law of unfair competition includes trademark infringement, although most
states have a separate cause of action for infringement of a common law trademark.
Paces sufficient to allege a cause of action tinder state law may also be actionable under
the Lanham Act. Nevertheless, it is well settled that where the plaintiff chooses not to
invoke his federal rights the federal courts have no jurisdiction. See, e.g., NI. & D. Simon
Co, v. R. Fl. Macy & Co., 152 F. Stipp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (state suit alleging unfair
competition and ti•demark infringement held not removable Merely because the
trademark was federally registered).
Gully, '299 U.S. at 113-14.
L II
 This is especially true since much of the state law of unfair competition has its
origin in the pre-Erie federal common law. See Chaffee, Unfair Competition, 53 Hmtv.
REV. 1289, 1299 (1940).
1 " See note 121 .supra.
:5 R.A. CtioATE, CASES ANTI MATERIAL'S ON PATENT LAW 966 (1973).
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mon sense or of record that the coercive suit would have been based
on a federal claim, the federal claim would have been implied.'" This
would seem to suggest that where a threatened coercive suit could
have been based on a state or a federal claim, the uncertainty of this
circumstance alone might not necessarily be an absolute bar to re-
moval. Rather, the conferring of jurisdiction is a discretionary matter
which is to be based on the court's judgment about the probability of
the coercive action being federal.'"
IV. CONCLUSION
In the process of reaching its result, the Third Circuit in Lacoste
has rejected across-the-board the Wycoff approach to removal of state
declaratory actions. Skelly and Wycoff have been applied in the original
federal jurisdiction context so as to limit the expansive effect of de-
claratory judgments on federal question jurisdiction. Their approach
is a narrow one, which maintains the traditional scope of the well-
pleaded complaint rule by judging declaratory actions in their conven-
tional posture. The court's position in Lacoste therefore is trouble-
some, since Wycoff is dismissed under the rubric of lithiting federal
jurisdiction. Although in the instant case removal was denied, unan-
swered questions remain as to whether the application of' Wycoff con-
ceptually allows for greater removal freedom due to the unrestricted
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to declaratory com-
plaints. Perhaps the Third Circuit will retreat somewhat, utilizing a
two-step process which would apply Wycoff where a federal issue is
explicitly raised in the declaratory complaint. Such an approach would
minimize the possibility of conflict with Skelly and Wycoff. Even so,
since Wycoff is used by the Lacoste court in the original jurisdiction
context, this decision disrupts somewhat the symmetry and consistency
that exists between federal question removal and federal question
original jurisdiction. In an area otherwise confusing, it is questionable
whether the waters need to be muddied further. However, as the
court in Lacoste aptly notes, 128 all confusion could be eliminated by
adoption of the American Law Institute proposal. The ALI suggestion
is to permit removal based on a federal defense with certain enumer-
ated limitations.'" Aside from the attractiveness of its simplicity, this
approach would increase the probability that cases which hinge on
federal grounds will be litigated in federal court, and would
rationalize original jurisdiction by acting as a safety valve for those is-
sues which, although barred from original jurisdiction, are neverthe-
less federal in character and warrant consideration in a federal forum.
The Third Circuit's position, however, creates contradictions that are
126 506 F.2d at 345-46.
" 7 See id.
126 Id. at 346 n.10.
128 ALl STUDY, supra note 48, at 6-8.
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left unanswered and it. is questionable whether its justifications out-
weigh either the doorinal abberations or the individual injustice to
this defendant.
DANIEL. ENUELSTEIN
Freedom of Information Act—Exemption (4)—Research Designs
Contained in Grant Applications—Washington Research Project, Inc.
v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare' —In 1966 Congress
enacted the Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) to "[open] adminis-
trative processes to the scrutiny of the press and general public ...." 3
The Act provided that federal agencies shall make information in
their possession available to the public, in some cases through publica-
tion in the Federal Register, 4 and in others through availability for in-
spection and copying. 5 Exemptions were provided for certain types of
infortriation 3 as to which Congress apparently concluded that the
government's interest in non-disclosure outweighed the public's in-
' terest in disclosure.' Jurisdiction was vested by the Act in the United
States district courts to enjoin an agency from withholding records
and to order the production of any records improperly withheld. 5 In
such cases, the court shall determine the matter de novo and the bur-
den is on the agency to sustain its action."
In 1973, Washington Research Project, Inc. brought an action
under the FOIA in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), to compel disclosure of research designs contained in grant
applications pertaining to several specifically identified research
projects." These projects had been approved and funded by the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), a unit of the Public Health
Service of HEW." HEW contended" that the information was ex-
1 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended. (Supp. 1V. 1974). The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) was lint enacted in 1966. Act of July 4, 1966, Puh. L. No. 89-487, 80
Stat. 250, amending Administrative Procedure Act, cll. 324, §3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). It
was amended in 1967 by Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54. Pub. L.
No. 90-23 was in turn amended by Act of Nov.21,1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.
3
 Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. I, 17 (1974),
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970), as amended, (Supp, IV, 1974).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), as amended, (Stipp. IV, 1974).
7 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. I971).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, I974).
Id.
10 Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 931 (D.D.C.
1973).
" Id.
" Id. at 936.
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